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What is 'Postmodernism'? : 
A Quarter of a Century After 
AGNES HELLER* 
Roughly twenty-five years ago 'postmodernism', together with its 
siblings poststructuralism and deconstruction, appeared on the stage 
of the Western world accompanied by battle drums and trumpets. 
The cultural elite - in countries where they still existed - had to take 
sides, for or against. Some of their partisans hailed them as the most 
up-to-date trend, some of their enemies abused them as conservative. 
Some sophisticated minds praised them as liberators who finally put 
an end to the iron-hand dictatorship of high modernism, whereas 
others bemoaned the unmistakable signs of cultural and artistic decay 
and of the commercialization of taste. Yet, although those belonging 
to either camp took a firm stand, when the simple philosophical 
question 'what is it?', notably 'what is postmodernism?' was raised, 
almost everyone gave a different answer. Yet the dispute, the waves 
of which calmed down a long time ago, went on stormily for a few 
years. As I see it now, it exhibited an interesting melange of the 
language of high modernism and of the postmodern way of speaking 
in its several varieties. Postmodern theorists spoke the language 
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of universalism, mubilizing its usual contrasts of the new fighting 
the old, of the innovative challenging the fossilized, the progressive 
pushing out the conservative. Yet postmodernism exhibited 
simultaneously a colorful heterogeneity, where everyone added a 
new colour to the palette, and everyone spoke about something else 
than the other. 
Let me advance here one of my conclusions: the postmodern 
perspective can claim at least momentary victory simply on the ground 
that such and similar universalistic debates have since disappeared 
from the horizon of the secular cultural world. Sharp polemics may 
evolve around a single event or work, such as a happening, a building 
(or its architect), an exhibition or a museum, a novel, a composer, a 
performance. In such debates several perspectives can clash, whether 
the clashes be purely artistic or include also political or ethical 
elements. Yet the battle cries surrounding the controversies of the 
scene twenty-five years ago - 'this cannot be done anymore, this is 
out of date, this is no art at all' - one can hardly hear today. Instead 
of the old battle cries we practise more subdued ones such as 'this is 
not good, it is unskilful, a failure, dangerous, boring, ridiculous'. 
In 1982, in his at that time famous lecture, Lyotard made a good 
point when he attempted to formulate the difference between 
premodern and postmodern thinking about art in the following way: 
the premodern asked what beauty is, the postmodern asks what art 
is.! Today one can raise both questions, even though one does not 
need to raise either of them. 
In his talk Lyotard was first and foremost to describe the concerned 
specificity of the postmodern way of creating and judging. Several 
things that he believed to be central issues in postmodern creations 
turned out to be marginal. Yet he put his finger on something 
important when he insisted that postmodern language, regard or 
perspective is a de-totalizing language, regard and perspective. True, 
Lyotard hailed the tendency of de-totalizing with extreme pathos 
and an ultimate universality claim. He said that we must declare 
war on the Whole, we should bear witness to non-representability, 
we ought to stand for difference, we ought to rescue the difference, 
rescue the 'honour of the Name'. Humph! Perhaps it is not the 
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invisible Jewish God whose honour will be rescued in post-modern 
art. To this otherwise fine remark I would add only that, although 
the rejection of holism is, indeed, one of the outstanding features of 
the postmodern perspective, still, as it turned out, the presentation of 
the Whole remains one option among many options in postmodern 
arts. Postmodern art is like a household where one can make use of 
very different ingredients. Or, to speak philosophically, one might 
repeat with Leibniz that the best perspective is characterized by the 
greatest amount of heterogeneity in the smallest space. 
Taking up one point stressed by Lyotard and neglecting all 
the others - whether I agree or disagree with them - I will speak 
only about the tendency towards de-totalizing from a postmodern 
perspective, yet without pathos or enthusiastic commitments. I will 
take up the issue in the following steps: 
The de-totalizing of 
1. the concept of history 
2. the concept of truth 
3. forms of life 
4. the arts; and finally 
5. I will speak briefly about the postmodern arrangement 
of museums. 
Why I discuss de-totalizing in this exact sequence will be clear, I hope, 
at the end of my paper. 
There is one single thought I need to advance: re-totalizing, among 
other aspects of today's fashionable fundamentalism, is but an answer 
to de-totalizing, the result, and seeming reversal, of the former. But the 
reversal is in one important sense only a seeming one, for this newly 
bred holism, more often than not, is re-totalizing a fragment. 
1. The concept of history 
One should begin the discussion with the de-totalizing of the modern 
understanding of history, since the decline of the grand narrative 
and the deconstruction of metaphysics have by now become a 
philosophical commonplace. It could be further said, perhaps, that 
the decline of grand narrative followed directly from the destruction 
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uf metaphy~ic~, ~ince the grand narrative wa~ the mu~t ~ignificant 
attempt so far to modernize metaphysics while temporalizing it 
in the form of world history. In the grand debate twenty-five years 
ago this was not yet evident. The first 'postmoderns' spoke with 
gusto about the end of history and the dawn of 'post histoire'. 
This was often interpreted as a declaration of a new age: we left behind 
the modern age and we stepped into another, postmodern age. This 
idea, similar to the declaration by Lyotard mentioned above, was 
deeply rooted in the tradition of modernistic thinking which it was 
meant to overcome For it is exactly in the spirit of the grand narrative 
that we have to step from an old epoch into a new one, and that we 
need also to be able to give a fairly precise account of the periods 
we left behind, as well as to describe somehow the specificity of 
the new one. This is not de-totalizing. We can speak of de-totalizing 
only when the conception of change in perspective is substituted 
for the conception of the change of periods. The grand narrative 
does not disappear because we stepped into a new period while 
overcoming modernity, but because we look at modernity from 
a different perspective. To paraphrase Hegel, it is not the case that 
we postmoderns finally succeeded in looking at history rationally 
and so it looks back at us also rationally, but because we look 
at history, or rather histories, differently, they look back at us 
differently. I could formulate the situation with a little simplification 
in the following way: 
The postmodern interpretation of modernity has replaced the 
modernist interpretation of modernity; that is, we see ourselves 
differently from before. And since we look at modernity differently 
from before we see it differently, not only as far as its content but 
also as far as its structure is concerned We do not see it anymore as 
a Whole where everything is quasi-organically related to everything 
else, nor as an epic poem, where the story ends with marriage or with 
death. Rather we see history as a mosaic that consists of heterogeneous 
pieces of colored glass, which mostly do not even fit together. Seen 
from this perspective, modernity cannot be regarded as a progressive 
or a regressive period of History; even if from one aspect one can 
see progress, from another aspect one sees regress and, from a third, 
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one sees both. Precisely because of the heterogeneity of the modern 
world there is place for action, decision, evaluation. Seen from the 
de-totalizing perspective of the postmodern, the modern world is 
fragile, and we know very little about its future. This is another reason 
to believe that action, decision, evaluation might make a difference. 
In my little, old-fashioned formulation, the postmodern perspective 
is the self-consciousness of modernity. 
Yet when speaking of the postmodern perspective as the self 
consciousness of modernity, I have not offered a definition of the 
'postmodern'. (No more than my confession, that from this and this 
moment onwards I understand my own life differently, would serve 
as a definition of my life. The simile is not very much forced, since 
generations do not change their perspectives about their own life at 
any contingent moment.) The reversal or change of the gaze looking 
at modernity is not independent of historical events and especially 
not of historical traumas and the analytical work which has been 
performed on these traumas. The experience of Nazism, of Stalinism, 
of the work performed on those traumatic experiences, and even the 
movements of 1968 prompted the reversal of the regard. The gestation 
of a de-totalizing position was already noticeable in certain tendencies 
of the 1968 events. Later, the decomposition of the grand narrative 
was reinforced by the experience of increasing globalization, from two 
additional aspects: first, because spatiality begins to playas important 
a role as temporality in historical narratives, and time experience 
appears as space experience; second, because almost every people, 
group, ethnicity, religion, form of life, or culture seeks to establish 
its own identity / difference within a shared/ modern culture. I have 
already mentioned that this identity-forming trend can also end 
up in totalizing and thus in fundamentalism, in its local and not its 
universalizing shape. Finally, I must add that, from a postmodern 
perspective, that perspective is itself regarded with irony and a 
grain of scepticism. One cannot declare confidently from a postmodern 
perspective that having overcome all errors we finally know well what 
modernity is. 
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2. The concept of truth 
Twenty-five years ago and in the following decade the charge of 
having 'relativized' truth - or, rather, the concept of truth - was 
brought against the so-called postmodern thinkers, Foucault and 
Derrida included. The charge is sheer nonsense since one can speak 
of 'relative' only if one has already subscribed to an Absolute, for 
example to a Hegelian system. Yet the de-totalizing of the concept of 
truth questions the relative together with the absolute. 
Needless to say, the tendency to de-totalize truth is not a recent 
development. It started in the Age of Enlightenment, when the 
authority of Reason was queried or at least kept within a boundary. 
After all, Absolute Truth/ the certainty of Reason presupposes an 
Ultimate Authority which warrants it. God could no longer remain the 
absolute warranty, at least not in mainstream philosophical thinking. 
The grand narrative replaced God insofar as it presented the Absolute, 
Truth as the Certainty (in contrast to subjective, primitive certainties) 
as the result of historical development. Then, the holistic concept of 
Truth was replaced in the nineteenth century by the regional concept 
of truth, that of 'true knowledge' in something, of something. This 
new concept leaves behind the metaphysical claims, for it accepts as 
true only statements or theories which remain open to falsification. 
At the same time it preserves the legitimacy claim of the traditional 
concept of truth, given that science legitimates, authenticates the 
sole truth for the time being. Whatever is scientific, or claims to be 
scientific, is believed to be by definition true. 
The postmodern perspective also pluralizes the scientific 
concept of true knowledge insofar as it de-totalizes it and treats it 
genealogically. Let me mention three, to my mind essential, steps 
in this direction. The first is the theory of paradigms as elaborated 
by Kuhn, which already introduced perspective change into the 
understanding of scientific theories and their truths. The second 
is Foucault's gambit, the substitution of the genealogical question 
'How is truth produced?' for the traditional question 'What is truth?'. 
The third is deconstruction as practised by Derrida, who allows texts 
to elaborate a truth and then to erase it. In Derrida's mind all truth 
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claims are deconstructed, but the concepts of truth and of justice are 
not, because they cannot be, since they are deconstruction itself. 
3. Forms of Life 
Once upon a time there was a slogan: anything goes. This slogan 
tried to make the process of de-totalizing understandable and 
misunderstandable. Every story is a good one if we aCl~pt it, every 
theory or description is true if it is plausible and if we can do 
something with it, every painting, writing, piece of music qualifies 
as 'art' if we decide so. Everyone lives in a way she or he pleases. 
Interpreted in this way, post-modern equals negative liberty, this 
time not for single persons alone. Not just that I can do whatever 
pleases me but, in addition, I do not break or hurt any norm or rule 
and I will not be censored by anyone for living as I like. From this 
interpretation the enemies of the postmodern 'condition' drew the 
too-simplified conclusion that the so-called postmodern world would 
result in the dissolution of all social, moral and artistic norms and 
rules, leading to absolute nihilism while its friends were celebrating 
the end of terror, the long-awaited freedom, fantasy, wish-fulfilment 
and the satisfaction of desires. 
A quarter of a century later one must admit that, at least where 
forms of life are concerned, many things go without being generally 
censored. This is true especially of the increasing plurality of sexual 
relations and preferences. Ways of life which were abhorred as 
unnatural, sheer madness, sinful on the one hand, or lionized as 
revolutionary on the other, are now taken for granted, a matter of 
routine. Homosexual marriage is a claim for adjustment. 
Still, there is a tendency to the opposite, where fewer and 
fewer things' are going'. One of the most telling examples is the 
narrowing of the career avenue. You can live as a lesbian, you can 
take seriously the beliefs of Christian Science, but if you want to 
develop any of your abilities and get a position you desire, you 
cannot do as you please; or else, since you must spend long years in 
schools, you need to earn several degrees. You can treat regulations 
and rules with irony, but is rational to abide by them. The constraints 
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are mobile, yet not always also elastic. 
, Anything goes' thus sounds an empty slogan and perhaps the 
formula of a utopia - for some a negative, for others a positive one. 
In fact, many things one desired to do twenty-five years ago are 
routine nowadays, while many things one was then free to practise, 
and which promised some rewards, became a blind alley. Some things 
'go', others do not. 
And yet, one can also say that the slogan is not as empty as it 
sounds. ' Anything goes' does not necessarily mean that everyone 
can do what she or he desires and get away with it, but that everyone 
can choose a form of life and get away with it. There are constraints 
in every form of life, yet different constraints. I accept such and such 
constraints, for example, getting three degrees; another accepts other 
constraints, such as living in the countryside and doing occasional 
work. In a well known film one man chooses to submit to the 
constraints necessary to become a famous concert pianist, a second 
plays the piano in a country pub and lives in peace. Both, finally, enjoy 
what they are doing. The postmodern perspective allows the person 
who leads one way of life to understand the person who chooses an 
entirely different way, without attributing moral or social superiority. 
This is indeed possible, although not widely practised. 
But is it' obligatory' to withhold judgment, is it right to do so? The 
answer is easy in the case of talented pianists, but the alternatives are 
usually harder. After all, some may prefer a life on drugs, whereas 
others may choose a life at the psychological and financial expense of 
another human being, whom they keep on a short leash of emotional 
or sexual dependency. The moral question cannot be answered in 
its generality. If you were to ask me to judge, there would be cases 
where I would tell you 'live as you please, only do not pass judgment 
upon us, and above all, do not force us to do what we do not want to 
do' and there would be cases where I would cry out, with Voltaire, 
'crush the infamous!' 
The grand narratives - in both their 'progressive' and 'decadent' 
versions - identified Enlightenment and modernity. Philosophies 
of 'progress' promised that in modernity the project of the 
Enlightenment would carry - through conflicts - the final victory, 
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albeit it was for the time being still an unfinished project. 
Philosophers of decadence warned us that the destructive powers 
of Enlightenment, after having been set free in modernity, would 
increase their destructive power until the collapse of Western 
civilization. From a postmodern perspective modernity shows an 
altogether different picture. There are also among the confessed 
'postmoderns' a few thinkers - for example Zygmund Bauman 
- who equate Enlightenment and modernity in its culture-critical 
version. For my part - joining many others - I do not share this 
vision. In my understanding Enlightenment and modernity, 
or Enlightenment and 'humanism', are far from identical. 
Totalitarian systems like Nazi Germany or the Stalinist Soviet 
Union were absolutely modern. Bauman would agree and add that 
Auschwitz and the Gulag were the descendants of Enlightenment. 
This conception could be accepted only if one held the belief 
that Romanticism is the only legitimate branch of the tree of 
Enlightenment. Yet, even if it is one of the branches, there are other 
branches of the same tree which mediate an entirely different 
message, as has been presented in Foucault's beautiful essay 
'What is Enlightenment?'.2 Nowadays one could also point at new 
historical phenomena such as religious fundamentalism which 
turns openly against Enlightenment, although it is modern beyond 
any doubt. To cut a long story short: the postmodern perspective is 
pluralistic, and there are as many theories as thinkers presenting them. 
Yet one can safely say that it inherited something from Romanticism 
and something else from Enlightenment proper: the sense of irony 
on the one hand, and the tendency towards scepticism on the other 
hand. 
4. The arts 
Roughly a quarter of a century ago the postmodern perspective 
occupied the stage as 'postmodernism', as a new tendency in the 
arts, in opposition to classical or 'high' modernism. People started 
to speak about postmodern style in contrast to 'modernist style' in 
architecture; and not without reason, given that Bauhaus on the 
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one hand, minimalism on the other, were regarded as the dernier 
cri in modernist architecture. There were buildings constructed in 
a 'postmodern', that is post-Bauhaus and post-minimalist, style. 
Museums, hotels and other public buildings wear on their very body 
the defunct styles they quote, among others the various forms of 
secession, or sometimes even the styles, of Italian Fascism. Architecture 
and sculpture begin to merge, unusual materials are used, fantasy 
is set free. Modernists cried wolf, and mobilized the faithful against 
commercial eclecticism and allegedly bad, barbaric taste, with very 
little success. Obviously so, for if we were just to imagine a whole city 
populated by minimalist buildings alone we would die of horror and 
boredom, even if we judged each and every building individually as 
'sublime'. (One should not forget that according to both Adorno and 
Lyotard modernism embodies the sublime.) 
The postmodern style in architecture immediately gathered a 
decent army of followers among sophisticated aesthetes, and thus 
the old story seemed to be reiterated: once again the new fighting 
the old. Not that the buildings were fighting but the ideas concerning 
building. This kind of battle belongs now to the past, because one 
can build in all 'styles', and moreover the style of each and every 
building becomes personal. The sole aesthetic criterion is that the 
building impress us as uniquely beautiful, that it be attractive, and - in 
Libeskind's formulation - tell its own story. As the Jewish Museum 
in Berlin, the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao or the new building of 
the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York verily do. 
At the beginning, the true postmodern believers contrasted the 
freedom of postmodernist works and ideas with the terror of high 
modernism. It would be impossible to deny that there was such a 
terror -practised first and foremost by art critics, exhibition organizers, 
gallery owners, concert managers, aesthetes, and especially by the 
numerous declarations and manifestos issued regularly by the 
ideologues of modernist schools. Adorno banned from music the 
common chord, which allegedly represents reconciliation with an 
alienated world; in painting, figurative works -like those of Lucien 
Freud-were looked at by disapproving eyes; in literature, there 
was zero tolerance for a linear story or for identifiable characters. If 
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we have all those ideological restrictions in mind, postmodernism 
appears in fact as liberating - since it has not replaced ancient 
restrictions with new ones, but lifted all restrictions of a general 
kind. One can still believe with Nietzsche that it is easier or even 
more refined to dance in chains, but one can hardly say that the same 
chains are good for everyone. 
One can ask, of course, where modernism ends and postmodernism 
begins, but it does not make much sense, since neither modernism 
ended nor post modernism began at one point. Whatever specific 
differences one may attribute to postmodernism, none of them will 
be helpful. Let us say that postmodern art is playful, and prove it 
with the works of the recently deceased Niki de Saint-Phalle. Yet 
what about surrealism? Was it not playful enough? Or were the 
surrealists already 'postmodern' without knowing it? Let us say that 
installation is a postmodern genre. What about Duchamp or Yves 
Klein? Were they postmodern? And where does post-modernism 
begin, for example, in music, where the common chord is slipping 
back? In Messiaen, or perhaps in Part, or only in the postminimalist 
Glass? Yet from a postmodern perspective one does not usually ask 
such questions. One does not in fact attach importance either to the 
questions or to the answers, precisely because one does not think in 
terms of the grand narrative. Let me briefly enumerate three different, 
yet related, aspects of this kind of thinking. 
First, the problematic of historicism in art. Nowadays, one's 
appreciation of a work of art, be it a novel, a painting, a piece of music 
or a building, is not normally dependent on the historical moment 
or the geographic place of its creation. Cries of enthusiasm such as 
'Fantastic! Already in the fifteenth century! How much he advances 
his time!'; or deprecating remarks such as 'In his time in Paris, they 
already painted in the impressionistic style, whereas he still ... ',are no 
more in vogue. When a modernist being guided round a wonderfully 
built, elegant and sophisticated medieval castle in Stockholm was 
informed that the castle was built in the nineteenth century, he 
immediately lost interest and stopped even looking at it. For an eye 
that looks at a building or any work from a postmodern perspective, 
the sense of beauty has nothing to do with dating and attribution. 
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(Certainly, monetary value has a lot to do with it, especially in the case 
of paintings.) The citizens of Budapest can nowadays freely enjoy the 
neo-gothic and eclectic Parliament building, whereas fifty years ago 
sophisticated citizens would have been ashamed to admit their love 
and appreciation. We all learned in the thirties that the beginning as 
well as the summit of modernist literature was Proust's novel and 
Joyce's Ulysses. Yet this historical pairing tells us very little today. For a 
contemporary reader Ulysses has far more to do with Don Quijote than 
with Remembrance afTimes Past, while Proust's novel seems far more 
to do with Balzac or Stendhal than with Joyce's novel. And there are 
no few among us who admire one but not the other without shocking 
sophisticated readers. We are no more in duty bound to consider 
Aristophanes as the greatest comedy writer of them all because he 
was the first and he happened to be a Greek. From the postmodern 
perspective there are no sacred cows, nor are there untouchables. 
This is why the practice of iconoclasm is groundless. We turn towards 
certain artists or works of art, as we can also turn away from them, 
but without drama. Some cultural critics warn us that this is as much 
a loss as a gain. For if there is no more' agon' in the world of arts, art 
works will lose their social significance. This may be true, but will not 
necessarily remain true. The new generation can read, look, listen, 
decide, appreciate, evaluate, in a far more personal way than has 
happened before. The question remains whether this practice turns 
judgments into subjective or contingent ones or whether it rather 
serves as a counterpoise to the tyranny of advertisements and the 
culture industry. It needs to be added that Harold Bloom was right: 
the postmodern way of reading and thinking has not destroyed the 
so called Western Canon, only opened it up. 
The second most important feature of the postmodern way of 
thinking, to my mind, is de-totalizing the concept' Art'. The concept 
'Art' is in fact not very old, it is essentially modern. It counts as a 
commonplace in cultural history that it did not occur to anyone in 
the Middle Ages, for example, to encompass in one and the same 
concept such different things as sacred (church) music, marketplace 
comedy, lyric poetry or a castle. 'Art', encompassing all of these 
and more, is a universalistic concept and as such a product of the 
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Enlightenment. It made itself at home especially on the European 
Continent. The English language still distinguishes between art 
and literature even if the English art theorist does not. 
The traditional universalistic concept' Art' occupied a central 
role in the high modernist vision of the art world, not because the 
concept was taken for granted as it had been in the nineteenth 
century, but precisely because it was no longer taken for granted, 
because it became problematic. This was the reason for Lyotard's 
already mentioned dictum, that 'what is art?' became the decisive 
question of the modernist vision. It followed from this vision that 
all the main tendencies and schools of the modernist art world, such 
as impressionism, expressionism, symbolism, secession, surrealism, 
dadaism, constructivism, minimalism and so on, had to make their 
presence in all kinds of' Art', at least in painting, sculpture, architecture, 
music, and all literary genres. Yet arts are different, genres within a kind 
of art are also different, and they resist vehemently being subjected 
to the same tendency or school. If the pressure of famous art critics is 
too overwhelming, artists cannot resist, or at least they try to write or 
paint or compose as far as possible according to the last ideologically 
underpinned mode. But though we try as hard as we can, there is no 
surrealistic music nor surrealistic architecture, and though minimalism 
was forced upon literature - not without success - it could boast 
only minor results compared with the essential ones in architecture or 
in music. The hidden or outspoken demand that the same tendencies 
should be presented in all kinds of arts and at the same time - this 
ideological terror has completely withered with the appearance of the 
postmodern. A video artist is not interested in what kinds of styles, 
if any, are preferred in literature. The moderns hailed the autonomy 
of art, the postmoderns the autonomy of every single work of art. 
Let me turn to the third specificity of post-modern practice in arts 
and art theory. 
It has been said and repeated for several years, sometimes with 
dismay, at other times with fervour, that there is no more avallt-
garde. As, naturally, there is no arriere-garde either. This development 
resembles very much the shift in the understanding of history. One 
can do everything that has been done in the past: figurative painting 
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is back, so are realism and naturalism, yet one can also paint in the 
abstract style, and minimalism has its fans. Palimpsests have become 
widespread. One can compose opera for the stage, symphony for an 
orchestra, electronic music, one can compose on a computer, and so 
on. In literature one can compose text, also minimalist texts, but the 
old kind of novel is also back with its stories and characters. The idea 
that the past is constantly in the present appears in the postmodern 
staging of traditional works, whether operas, comedies or tragedies. 
Everything is possible on the stage, fantasy flies free, here truly 
anything goes if it works. 
Although there is no avant-garde in the sense that the new does 
not appear as the promise, as the redeeming 'yes', still there are new 
art-forms. Some among them revive old, long ago extinct genres. 
Once upon a time there was an art called 'living picture', and now it 
appears again. Silhouette or shadow-playas an art-form - mentioned 
also by Kant - is back. Video artists revive the wonderful and defunct 
style of silent movies; other video artists, such as Bill Viola, conjure 
up the spirit of Renaissance painting. The first photo artists of the 
nineteenth century presented their models frequently in period 
costumes. This kind of photography has been out of fashion for a 
long time, yet now we enjoy it again in the works of Cindy Sheerman 
and others. Blurring of the limits of various art-forms and genres, a 
tendency which was already there in high modernism, continues. 
In this manner, it is not the arts that have changed 'periods', but 
rather the perspectives from which we look at them, and the ideas, 
ideologies which surround them. This means - in this case - simply 
that a work of art will be neither better nor worse because it remains 
confined within the limits of one genre alone or because it merges 
two or three genres in one. 
I would like to return briefly to one of my former, perhaps 
enigmatic, remarks: anything goes if it works. What does it mean, 
that a work of art 'works'? That it impresses us as being' art'? That 
the listener or the viewer perceives it as such? There is no unanimous 
answer to this question as there was none to the question 'why is 
something seen or heard as beautiful?' This is, however, the slightest 
of all problems. One is not concerned because no unanimous answer 
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can be given to questions, 'what makes something beautiful?' or 
'what makes this and this a work of art?' but because those questions 
are raised at all. Why do we consider those questions meaningful 
at all? 
I will answer one of the questions tentatively. Why cannot we 
help asking whether this or that work is a work of art? The question 
includes the hidden agenda, the other question: what makes a 
work of art a work of art? Since this question is, contrary to the one 
concerning beauty, a modern one, the answer, if there is answer (not 
to the question itself but to the importance of the question), needs to 
be sought somewhere in the modern human condition. 
The modern world is a functional one. Instead of asking questions 
concerning' essences' we ask questions concerning functions. The 
question concerning art is raised because we attribute a specific 
function to works of art, and we want to know whether this or that 
painted thing, piece of music or work of literature does perform 
this function or not. To put it bluntly: in my view the function of 
works of art in modernity is to offer us sense, render meaning to life 
experiences, illuminate those experiences, very painful experiences 
included, make us think them over, and do all this in a sensually 
enjoyable way, giving us pleasure. Many experiences in life give us 
both pleasure and pain, and these experiences - first and foremost 
love - are the most significant ones. But mostly they do not provide 
us also with the meaning of those experiences, especially not of the 
painful ones. Many things and events give us only pleasure without 
pain, such as a nice dress, a good dinner, or an entertaining book, but 
we never expect them to live up to the function of sense-rendering, 
especially not in rendering sense to pain, trauma, grief. One can turn 
also to wisdom books or to philosophy, which may fulfil this function, 
yet they do it without offering sensual pleasure and joy. 
The chief difference between art and entertainment is not that 
art is good and entertainment is bad. There is also bad art and good 
entertainment. The difference lies in their respective functions. 
From this it does not follow that good art cannot be entertaining, 
for it often is, and it does not follow either that works created 
for entertainment will never render meaning or sense to one's 
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experiences. We deal in both cases with illocutionary acts. 
Advertisements can also be well done, witty, even beautiful, yet they 
are perlocutionary acts. This is also true of political posters. 
Bad art is the kind of art which does not perform its function, 
because of poor quality, well-meant dilettantism, lack of talent, being 
miscarried. It is a misunderstanding that since we do not expect art 
critics to promote one tendency in art over another, there is no task 
left for them. They are expected to give their expert opinion, which 
includes practised taste, as to whether a work is well done or is a 
failure, and, further, to put into the centre, to promote, the artists 
and the works of art which, in their mind, perform the function of 
rendering meaning on the highest level, and which simultaneously 
provide great satisfaction for our senses. 
5. The postmodern arrangement of museums 
One of the most popular slogans of modernist art theory soun ded 
'demolish, raze down the museums!' Those museums suggest that 
the old masters were better than us. Some modernist music theorists 
declared the death of opera. It is a bourgeois genre, it must leave the 
stage! Modernist writers declared that the old ones were conservative 
fools. For example, Aragon organized a demonstration of avant-garde 
writers against Anatole France at his funeral. It is well known that 
political radicalism, both left and right radicalism, claimed a leading 
role in modernist movements. 
The de-totalizing of the grand narrative resulted among other 
things in the disappearance of this kind of radicalism. One can abuse 
postmodernists as conservatives solely from the position of modernist 
radicalism. Postmodernists do not organize demonstrations at the 
funeral of somebody because they do not like his style, they do not 
boo authors just because they represent another trend. Theatre-lovers 
visit the kind of theatres which they can expect to stage plays to their 
taste. One may regret that there are no scandals. Yet where there is 
no scandal, there is no terror either. 
In between several things happened to the museums. 
One cannot expect anyone to speak about museums in general. 
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There are museums for everything almost everywhere. Museums 
are among the greatest tourist attractions. One can think randomly 
of Bilbao, Barcelona or of the so-called 'Museumviertel' in Vienna. 
Among all the museums, the kind called Museum or Gallery 
of 'fine arts', the ones which exhibit works of art, of applied arts, 
or archeological finds, and incidentally products of other cultures 
which can be also looked upon as works of art, still occupy pride 
of place. Traditional museums collected works which have supposedly 
already proved their timeless value. This was true also in times of 
modernism. Those were the museums which modernists tried to 
demolish, at least in a spiritual sense. 
Instead of the museums being crushed, the conception of 
the museum has changed in the last decades. The change took 
place roughly in three steps: first, the emergence of museums of 
contemporary arts; second, the re-arrangement of the tradition; 
third, the organization of concentration on single works of art which 
hold the possibility of anarchy. Since the traditional museums of 
fine arts allow for little re-arrangement - which is by no means a 
shortcoming - I can mention only a few new museums or some new 
wings of the old ones. 
The most important innovation is the appearance of the museums 
of contemporary art. The concept of the museum and the concept 
of being contemporary seem to contradict one another, but only if 
we think of museums in the spirit of the grand narrative. Then only 
the dead masters can have a place in a museum. The task of the 
museum is to keep the dead alive, to show that there are dead who 
live forever, because they will never be forgotten. The traditional 
museum is the temple of memory. Whoever enters the gates of this 
temple will 'repeat', just as one repeats in the temple, the same 
liturgy, the same ceremony, about the same creed and the same story. 
On the contrary, the contemporary art museums collect the spirit of 
living artists. The conception does not include repetition. It can be 
presupposed that someone who enters this museum looks at a work 
for a first time even if she or he is eighty years old and a frequent 
visitor of galleries. It can be presupposed that no one could have 
seen this work before, because it has not yet existed. In a museum 
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of contemporary art the present undresses, shows itself, introduces 
itself. It raises a claim to the sense-rendering function of art even 
by presenting itself as senseless. But this remains the sole claim. 
The works presented in contemporary art museums do not raise 
necessarily and simultaneously a claim to 'eternal validity', not 
even to longevity; for example, an installation could hardly do so. 
Yet still, and in all cases, the regard the viewer casts at the object 
will be a 'yes vote' or a 'no vote'. I know that these few and vague 
sentences should have been followed up by detailed elaboration, 
but to continue this chain of thought would take us far away from 
the subject matter of this paper. 
There is only one additional thing I want to stress. An important 
new conception is developing in the artistic arrangement of museums 
in general, and especially in the newly established museums. 
Attention is concentrated on single art objects. That is, the context 
loses significance, for it is presupposed that the single work is its 
own context. It is indifferent or it seems to be indifferent to which 
other objects are placed closest to it, before, beside or above it. Once 
upon a time modernist art theorists abused museums on the ground 
that they presented works out of context. We were advised that 
a Medieval altar belonged in a Medieval church; in the museum 
it was out of context and thus not really meaningful. Museums 
inspired by the ideas of high modernism tried to correct this fault. 
A typical example is the 'Cloisters' museum in New York, where 
whole churches were built inside the museum to let the spectator 
see the sacred images in their quasi-original context. All this is sheer 
romanticism. There are several conceptions of arranging museums 
in our age, given that the postmodern position does not exclude 
any approach if it 'goes'. Yet, as mentioned, one of the significant 
conceptions of arrangement is exactly context/ indifference. This 
is how one can exhibit in the same room four paintings, some pieces 
of furniture, a hanging scroll and a sculpture, not created in the 
same period or the same place. This is indeed anarchy, but anarchy 
with this purpose: the spectator should concentrate on one object, 
independently of the other ones. 
However, all this looks odd to an eye used only to the museum 
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arrangement of classical or high modernism. If we cast a glance, 
for example, at the aesthetic works of Hutcheson, we will see how 
in the eighteenth century he recommended exactly this principle 
to the wealthy nobility who aspired to populate their castles and 
their gardens with works of art and other things of beauty and good 
taste. 
Yet there is still an institution which has mostly, albeit not 
everywhere or always, preserved the spirit of the grand narrative even 
after its demise. And this is a central institution of art: the traditional 
Gallery (or Museum) of Fine Arts. Museums or Galleries of Fine Arts 
generally embody the grand narrative at its classical best. This is so if 
they tell the whole story, as the Metropolitan Museum and the Louvre 
do; it is also the case if they present the spectator with one or other 
chapter or one single thread of the story, as the British Museum and 
the Kunsthistorisches Museum do. 
All the museums or galleries of fine arts are in the last instance 
illustrations to Hegel's Aesthetics. We start the story somewhere in 
Egypt and in the region of the Tigris and Euphrates, then follow 
with the Greeks, the Romans, the Middle Ages. (At some point and 
somewhere one has to insert also the works from the Far East.) Then 
we turn to early modern art where we divide nations (in the case 
of Italian Renaissance, the cities) and follow the narrative within 
nations. There are galleries of English, German, French, Dutch art, 
yet within these and similar groupings the arrangement still needs 
to follow the historical sequence. It is not easy to satisfy both criteria 
(time and nation) yet they try hard. In the nineteenth century the 
styles also enter the stage in arranging European (and American) art, 
again in a quasi-historicist setting. There will be for example a cluster 
of French pre-impressionism, impressionism, post-impressionism, 
etc. Sometimes the outcome is funny. I have seen Kandinsky put in 
the cluster of 'German expressionism'. Surely, the' ancient' can also 
be presented in a postmodernist manner, and there are already 
attempts at it, still very much resisted. Even such an innocent case 
as hanging one of the Monet water lily pictures in the vicinity of two 
contemporary works in the newly opened MoM A, met with an outcry 
from some art critics, although essentially the historicist arrangement 
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has been preserved obediently almost everywhere. 
One can of course ask if only conservative habits resist innovations 
and the de-totalizing of traditional Art Galleries? Or is there, perhaps, 
an inherent value in looking at paintings, statues, and even furniture 
and things of use as 'embodied' history? Is the attraction of this 
arrangement an important and even warning sign? Do we still need 
the crutch of the grand narrative? Or, let me reformulate the last 
question; do we need a place in the world of art where the grand 
narrative can still feel at home? 
At an earlier point I came up with the idea that de-totalizing 
has its limits both in daily practices and in the case of concepts 
such as truth, but that those limits are elastic, they are different in 
each case and change over time. I would now go further by asking 
the question: Do the collections of the Galleries (Museums) of Fine 
Arts, the collections of the dead kept alive, indicate the limit to the 
de-totalizing of the grand narrative? Is it just the habit, or also the 
sense-rendering function of art itself, which puts up fierce resistance 
against the total dismantling of the grand narrative in those museums? 
I would tentatively answer the question in the affirmative, although 
I do not know why. 
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